Israel in the Post Oslo Era: Prospects for Conflict and Reconciliation With the Palestinians by As'Ad Ghanem & Mohanad Mustafa & Salim Brake

Author:As'Ad Ghanem & Mohanad Mustafa & Salim Brake [Ghanem, As'Ad & Mustafa, Mohanad & Brake, Salim]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9780429762437
Google: Bqp-DwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 43329088
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-12-12T10:23:40+00:00

Basic components of Israel’s “post-Oslo” posture – Ariel Sharon’s legacy

Israel’s post-Oslo policy was based on the following considerations: demarcate the permanent borders of Israel unilaterally (not through bilateral agreements), keep a numerical Jewish majority within the borders of this state, and establish an accommodating authority on the Palestinian side to provide security and deliver basic economic and social functions and services. This would enable Israel to de-facto annex all of the land along the Green Line and the Jordan Valley, in addition to annexing large areas to establish contiguity between the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea. Furthermore, Israel would thicken settlements that were not to be evacuated by stepping up construction and encouraging Jews to settle there. This vision implied ceding control over densely populated Palestinian areas to a PNA and entailed the removal of Israeli settlements from these areas. Consequently, eight to nine segregated Palestinian enclaves would be established. Each would be surrounded by Israeli settlements and military structures. As such, Israel would not object if these enclaves were called a “Palestinian state”. Practically, this post-Oslo policy necessitated the following measures:

A unilateral withdrawal plan, formulated in light of Ehud Barak’s experiences at Camp David: It was actually Sharon who drafted and presented this plan as a new vision for dealing with the conflict in general and the occupation in particular. He presented it during the Herzliya conference on December 18, 2003, when it was referred to as the “unilateral disengagement plan”. Sharon rejected withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders but highlighted at the same time the “demographic danger”. Sharon sought to establish a system of segregation in historic Palestine by agreeing to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and 42% of the West Bank in return for annexing Palestinian areas where Jewish settlements and other strategic sites had been established (For more details, see Ghanem, 2006).

A number of factors contributed to Sharon’s success in freezing Washington’s Road Map and making his plan “the only game in town”. They included: Israel’s strong and special relationship with the US in a single-polar world led by Washington; a weak Arab world with its regional conflicts and divisive attempts to woo American support; an absence of meaningful opposition to Sharon’s plan in Israel, apart from the extremist right wing and the Likud party; and the unequivocal support of the Israeli left wing.

The “disengagement document” appeared in the form of a letter from Sharon to US President George W Bush on April 14, 2004. In a preface to the letter, Sharon insisted: “Israel is committed to the peace process and aspires to a negotiated settlement, on the basis of two states for two peoples: The state of Israel for the Jewish people and a Palestinian state for the Palestinian people”. Sharon justified the unilateral disengagement on the ground that “Israel has arrived at the conclusion that today there is no Palestinian partner to proceed with in a reciprocal peace process”. Sharon stressed that the unilateral disengagement plan was not contingent upon Palestinian cooperation and that it would take Israel to a “better security situation”.

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